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Abstract
Given the adoption of crypto-bartering during the 2018 financial crisis in Venezuela,
direct Internet search for bartering opportunities, or communities in Greece and Russia
exploring barter systems, why does the use of direct search technology not undermine
the importance of traditional forms of money? In this paper I demonstrate how a
market with more types of goods leads to greater dependence on money for exchange
transactions. Ultimately, agents self-impose a constraint on their search for goods only
if they hold money when the number of good types is infinite or suﬃciently large. This
result serves to reconcile competing mainstream views by showing that the cash-in-
advance constraint emerges as a subset of the money search model. Bartering exists if
and only if the number of good types is suﬃciently small that a double coincidence of
wants is more likely to occur. The condition for existence of a monetary equilibrium
depends on a large number of diﬀerent specialized goods. The reversion to a monetary
economy from sporadic bartering becomes inevitable when the economy expands and
agents demand more types of specialized goods.
JEL Classification: D83; E00
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1 Introduction
Random-matching models, spawned from two seminal papers by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,
1993), have been common in the money search theory literature. These two papers are the
successful attempts to brilliantly model money explicitly as a medium of exchange in eco-
nomics models. Technical restrictions in those models have drawn criticism. One criticism
is the randomness in matching. As noted by Howitt (2003), most people do not conduct
their daily economic transactions in a random-matching setting. Randomness in matching
is unrealistic but has been maintained in the models for tractability. Further developments
in money search models have moved away from random-matching towards more directed-
matching. For example, Corbae, Temzelides and Wright (2003) present a directed search
model with a cooperative mechanism in an exchange market, while Goldberg (2007) intro-
duces partial directed money search in a fully decentralized market.
For the analysis of monetary equilibrium, non-cooperative direct search is a more realistic
feature than partial directed or cooperative directed search. People normally visit stores to
get the goods they want without a third party coordinator. The entire search process is
self-direct and each agent can generally reach the sellers of their desired good. The non-
cooperative direct search model of money introduced in this paper is similar to the random
money search model of Burdett, Coles, Kiyotaki and Wright (1995), henceforth BCKW,
except that people directly search and know which available goods other agents sell. Ex-
ante, there are many identical sellers of a good, so the searcher can either randomize the
choice of seller or revisit a known seller to obtain the desired good. Unlike in partial directed
search, a seller in non-cooperative direct search is always able to provide the good whenever
approached by a buyer.
The random-matching models generated from Kiyotaki and Wright’s (1993), henceforth
KW, framework pose a technical challenge. An increasing number of good types, denoted k,
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will reduce the expected utility with or without money in a random search model1. When
k is suﬃciently large in a random search model, it will deter people from trade because the
expected utility diminishes. Even with the presence of money, people will not choose to trade
when there is a suﬃciently large variety of goods because the expected utility diminishes as
k increases. In the random meeting money search model, the role of trade and money would
disappear and the expected utility approaches zero as k ! 1. In other random meeting
papers (e.g. BCKW), a higher k increases the likelihood of an autarkic equilibrium, even
when money is introduced, given that search cost is imposed. This means the variety of
goods is not always positively correlated to trade or to the role of money in the random-
matching setting. However, it conflicts with the general perception that people are not less
willing to hold money to trade when the variety of goods increases in the market. This paper
shows that this is not the case in a direct money search model: when k ! 1, the role of
money becomes more apparent. This occurs because k is not in the matching probability
function with money holdings in the present direct search model.
When the information of the seller’s desire is absent, and the probability of a single
coincidence of want matching is low because k is suﬃciently large, money plays a role to
facilitate exchange. This would be suﬃcient for money to appear as a medium of exchange.
When k ! 1, the cash-in-advance constraint framework is shown to be a very special
case of the money search framework. When there is a suﬃciently large number of good
types, trading without money is not profitable because the possibility of barter is near zero,
so agents will only search for a good when they have money. The variety of goods is positively
correlated with trade with money, but negatively correlated with trade without money. No
agent will find it profitable to barter unless they have the cash in advance before searching for
1In Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), lim
k!1
rV1 =
 (1 M)
k(k   1) (U   ✏+ Vn   V1) +
 M
k ⇡(Vm   Vn   1) = 0 and
lim
k!1
rVm =
 (1 M)
k
⇧(U   ✏+ Vn   Vm) = 0 where V1, Vm and Vn are the value functions for not holding
money, holding money, and drawing a new preference shock. In the probability measure of k, the number
of desired good types being searched has to be infinitely many. Otherwise, if k is finite, this gives a zero
measure. In KW, @V1@k < 0 and
@Vm
@k < 0.
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a good. The cash-in-advance framework also proves to be a special case of the direct money
search framework, where k only needs to be suﬃciently large that there exists a transaction
cost or search cost.
The model setup is described in the next section. In Section 3, I describe the decision
problem faced by an agent. The autarkic equilibrium is also described in Section 3. In
Section 4, a monetary equilibrium with direct search is presented. A comparison between
the random-matching model and direct search, in terms of the eﬀect of k, is shown in Section
5. A welfare comparison between random-matching and direct search is shown in Section 6.
In Section 7, I conclude and discuss further lines of research.
2 The Model
The environment used in this paper is a non-cooperative direct search framework. The
framework used in this paper draws its ideas mainly from BCKW, and KW.
2.1 The Environment
A continuum of agents, i 2 [0, 1], live in discrete time with an infinite horizon and a finite
number of good types, k   3, where k is a finite integer. Each good is indivisible, uniform
in size and perishable at the end of each period. Each agent continues to specialize in
producing one unit of an agent-specific commodity good at the beginning of each period2
with a disutility (cost) of production, x. There are no production shocks, and each agent
can use his own production for consumption or possible bilateral exchange.
Each agent is a generalist in consumption and receives positive utility, u, by consuming
the type of good desired in that period, where u > x. Each agent is randomly assigned a
preference for the type of good he initially desires. If he happens to desire his own production
type, the agent will immediately consume it and draw a new preference. A new random
2This feature of producing a good in every period is a closer fit to the non-monetary general equilibrium
model.
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preference will be drawn at the end of the period only after the agent acquires the desired
good. Otherwise the agent will continue to desire the same type of good. If the agent
consumes a good not desired, his utility equals the disutility (cost) of producing a unit
of the good and it gives zero net utility3. An agent always consumes his own production
when there is no trade by the end of each period. The preference shocks are assumed to be
identically and independently drawn from a known uniform distribution of good types. The
preference drawn is private information known only to the agent, but his production type is
public information.
Money is indivisible, not perishable, cannot be produced and is randomly assigned ini-
tially to a fraction of agents, m. Each agent can only hold one unit of money balances.
A “non-moneyholder” possesses only one unit of a self-produced commodity good; a “mon-
eyholder” possesses one unit of money in addition to one unit of a commodity good4. A
non-moneyholder can only bring one unit of a commodity into the marketplace to trade;
whereas a moneyholder can bring one unit of money or one unit of a commodity, or both.
For each successful trade, both agents incur a transaction cost, ✏.
There are two decisions to make in every period: (i) search or stay, and (ii) reject or
accept trade. Both moneyholder and non-moneyholder can choose to search or stay. Each
agent chooses to search and trade only once and meets only one agent in a given period.
Otherwise, an agent has to wait for the next period to decide to search and trade again.
The trading decision is straightforward in the sense that an agent will only trade when he
finds the good he desires or when he is willing to exchange his production good for money.
Besides that, no agent would want to trade for a good he does not desire because each good
is perishable within the period and all agents exhibit self-interest; he would end up with
negative net utility from the trade due to the transaction cost. So, we focus more on the
decision to search or stay.
3This simplifies the model by ensuring that an agent will not receive any utility from consuming his own
production when he does not desire it.
4The setup in the conventional money search framework diﬀers from this paper, where an agent expects
to produce in every period and is able to possess a unit of a good and money at the same time.
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2.2 Search Process / Mechanisms
Amoneyholder becomes a buyer when he exchanges his money for a good. A non-moneyholder
becomes a seller when he trades his good for money. Anyone becomes a barterer whenever
he swaps his good for another agent’s good. If an agent gets his desired good, he consumes
it immediately. All agents who search will return to their home at the end of the period.
All sellers of the same type of production are located in a specific marketplace known to
all agents. The matching is endogenous such that the searcher self-directs exactly whom to
meet. However, the searcher does not know the seller’s desire. The information of the seller’s
desired good is revealed only after meeting. If an agent decides to search, he is assumed to
approach only a person who holds and owns the good he desires. So he know with certainty
who holds which goods, but he doesn’t know which good(s) those persons desire. When a
searcher arrives at a marketplace, the assumption of a continuum of agents means there are
infinitely many identical sellers of the desired good type for potential trade5. A searcher
is indiﬀerent about the identical sellers at the marketplace. Hence, a searcher is always
matched with a seller of the searcher’s desired good. The searcher knows his desired good
is available, but he does not know if one of the sellers will accept his oﬀer6. This feature is
more realistic than the partial directed search: we normally have prior knowledge about a
seller’s available stock of the desired good when we want to make a purchase, but we don’t
always know what the seller desires in return.
Every meeting between agents in this exchange economy will produce either a single
coincidence of wants or double coincidence of wants. No coincidence of wants does not
happen because an agent always directs himself to the seller of his desired good in this non-
cooperative direct search7. Revisitation is permissible in this model, but has no measurable
5This is a mathematical convenience to assume away the number of agents in matching as long as not all
agents are searching. The assumption of infinite agents is less realistic, but makes the model more tractable.
6Goldberg (2007) motivates the frictions in partially directed search with a probabilistic measure that a
searcher will acquire a good from a seller of his desired good. Unlike in Goldberg’s (2007) model, searchers
here also know which seller’s shop is open and has the capacity to supply the desired good.
7The absence of no coincidence of wants distinguishes this model from random-search or partially directed-
search models.
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Agent
W1:non-moneyholder
S1:commoditystay
V1:commodity
search
1-m
Wm:moneyholder
Sm:commodity,money
stay
Vb:commodity,moneysearch
Vn:commodity
search
Vm :money
sea
rch
m
Figure 1: The roles and strategies of agents.
eﬀect on payoﬀs. A searcher is indiﬀerent between randomly picking or revisiting a seller
because there is no advantage to knowing the seller’s past desire from a bartering exchange
in the previous period8. A searcher without money can only barter and a searcher with
money can either barter or exchange with money if the seller is willing to accept.
On the other hand, the stayer cannot dictate who will visit him for an exchange. As a
stayer, you remain at your store to welcome traders at no cost. A stayer who does not hold
money can either barter or be a seller, and a stayer who holds money can only barter because
of the assumed degenerate distribution of money holdings. The stayer has the opportunity
to meet with those who are searching only for that specific good type. This is symmetric for
all other agents.
8Let a searcher who draws the same preference choose to revisit the same seller who previously bartered
with him. He may not be able to barter with the seller because the seller may desire a good other than the
searcher’s production good due to the seller’s preference shock. When the searcher draws the same preference
again and intends to barter with the same trader, the probability of a successful barter by revisiting a
previously traded seller is the same as a random pick for any other identical seller.
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2.3 Value Functions and Equilibrium
The probability you will meet an agent who wants your good is 1k 1 , and the probability that
you would want his good is always 1 because you would only look for the good you desire in
this self-direct mechanism. The probability that a searcher would have the good you desire
is 1k 1 . Let m be the probability that you would meet with someone with money and 1 m
without money.
Let c1 and cm be the cost of searching and transport with commodity and with money,
where c1 > cm > 0. Assume that the cost of transport with money is zero, so cm is simply
the search cost9. The rate of time preference is r > 0, and ⇡ and ⇧ denote the best response
of an agent to accept money and the likelihood of acceptance of money by the other agent.
Let n1, nm, nb and ns be the proportions of non-moneyholders who search with a good,
moneyholders who prefer to search with money, moneyholders who search with both money
and commodity, and moneyholders who prefer to search with a good.
Let Wj denote the value function for an agent, where j 2 {1,m}; subscript 1 denotes
a non-moneyholder and subscript m denotes a moneyholder who holds a unit of money
and a unit of commodity. Vj and Sj denote the sub-value functions of a searcher and a
stayer, respectively. Vc and Vb are special cases for a moneyholder who prefers to search with
commodity only and with both money and commodity.
If the agent is a non-moneyholder, he chooses to search with commodity or stay at
steady-state, so as to maximize:
9Because the transport cost with money is zero, cm is the search cost, and so c1   cm is the transport
cost of a commodity.
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W1 =max{ U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
V1 :search with commodity
,
n1(1 m)
r(k   1) U +
mnc
r(k   1)U +
mnb
r(k   1)U +max⇡ [⇡(
mnm
r
+
mnb
r
k   2
k   1)( x  ✏+Wm  W1)]| {z }
S1 :stay with commodity
}
(1)
where10 U = (u x)kk 1   ✏.
If the agent is a moneyholder, he chooses to search with money at steady-state, with
commodity, with money and commodity, or stay with money and commodity, so as to max-
imize:
Wm =max{⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm]  cm
r| {z }
Vm :search with money
,
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
Vc :search with commodity
,
⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
  cm
r| {z }
Vb :search with money and commodity
,
n1(1 m) +m(nc + nb)
r(k   1) U| {z }
Sm :stay with money and commodity
}
(2)
An equilibrium is defined to be a Nash equilibrium such that each agent chooses the pure
and stationary strategy which maximizes his expected utility, contingent upon other agents’
strategies and the distributions of n1, nm, nb, ns resulting from the strategies chosen by other
10Similar to BCKW, if you draw a preference desiring your own good, you would consume it immediately
and then draw a new preference. The value function of drawing a preference desiring your own production
type, V0, is:
V0 = (u  x) + 1
k
V0 +
k   1
k
max{V1, S1} = k
k   1(u  x) +max{V1, S1}
u denotes the utlity in consuming one unit of desired good, and, U denotes the expected utility gained from
acquiring and consuming his desired good, including a draw to desire his own production type from a taste
shock.
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agents.
Assumption 1. A continuum of agents means there are infinitely many identical sellers of
the desired good type for potential trade as long as the fraction of agents who search is not
equal to 1.
Assumption 2. u   x > c1 > cm > ✏ > 0.
Lemma 1. Vi, Si   0 for i 2 {1,m, c, b}.
Any strategy used must have a value greater than or equal to zero because an agent could
choose the strategy to consume his own production forever to have a zero expected utility.
3 Non-monetary Equilibrium
In this model, the friction of matching is due to incomplete information: not knowing the
desire of the seller. If knowledge of the seller’s desire can be easily acquired, money is not
needed for the agents to perfectly coordinate. Hence, a non-monetary Walrasian equilibrium
could occur when everyone knows each seller’s desire.
Lacking information of the seller’s desire, there can be two possible non-monetary equi-
libria in a direct search money model. First, a non-monetary autarkic equilibrium could
exist when the searching strategies imply that no one is willing to search. Everyone stays,
and no trade occurs (similar to the results of Goldberg (2007) and BCKW).
Proposition 1. There exists a non-monetary autarkic equilibrium iﬀ c1 > U(k 1) and cm >
⇧(1 m)[U + x].
This result appears to be consistent with the standard money search models: (i) a non-
monetary autarkic equilibrium exists when the cost of searching with a commodity and
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money is higher than the possible gain from trade, (ii) no agent would want to search with
commodity when the variety of goods is suﬃciently large which diminishes the utility gained
from trade, and (iii) no agent wanting to search with money depends on the probability of
money being accepted and the fraction of money supplied to agents in the market. This
makes the probability of meeting another agent willing to accept money low, making it un-
profitable to search with money and a commodity. When each agent believes that all agents
follow these strategies, his optimal strategy is to stay. Since no agent chooses to search, no
trade occurs. This is an interesting result, in that the threshold of searching with money is
independent of the number of good types.
Proposition 2. There exists a non-monetary barter equilibrium iﬀ c1 < Uk 1 , with the re-
sulting distribution of n1 = 1  c1(k 1)u and cm > ⇧(1 m)[U + x].
When the number of good types is very low and the value of having money as a medium
of exchange is very small, a barter economy can emerge. This is consistent with a number
of observable cases. In ancient or primitive economies, where the variety of goods is limited
and the number of traded goods is low, bartering tends to prevail. Similarly, even in more
modern war-torn economies, survival depends on fewer types of goods, primarily food and
shelter, increasing the reliance on barter transactions. Indeed, bouts of hyperinflation during
such periods might be viewed as eﬀorts to flee from the use of money in favor of the direct
exchange of goods.
4 Monetary Equilibrium
A monetary equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with a list (W1,Wm) that satisfies the incen-
tive condition to hold money,  x  ✏+Wm W1 > 0, such that the gain in accepting money
exceeds zero, given a stationary distribution of n1, nm, ns. Only the equilibria where people
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accept money with probability ⇧ = ⇡ = 1 are considered.
There would exist a monetary equilibrium when agents get higher value by choosing
the strategy to accept money when the cost of searching is lower than the benefit of being
matched with the desired good in exchanging with money. The cost of searching with a
commodity must exceed the benefit of being matched in a bartering exchange, given the
utility in successfully acquiring the desired good and the probability of getting matched 1k 1 .
Proposition 3. There exists a monetary equilibrium if a moneyholder would not carry only
a commodity to search.
A moneyholder would not carry only a commodity to the market to search because this
implies a moneyholder chooses a strategy for which the payoﬀ is the same as for a non-
moneyholder. No one would accept money if a non-moneyholder can be equally as well-oﬀ
as a moneyholder. If that is the case, monetary equilibrium does not exist. A moneyholder
who carries only a commodity to search implies that search with money is not profitable;
this strategy is not possible in monetary equilibrium. It must be the case that searching
with money is profitable for a moneyholder; so this strategy of carrying only a commodity
to the marketplace is Pareto dominated in a monetary equilibrium.
Lemma 2. When an agent searches with money and a commodity, he will choose the strategy
to barter if possible; if not, then he would oﬀer money in exchange for a good.
Proposition 4. In monetary equilibrium, a moneyholder would carry both money and a
commodity to search iﬀ Uk 1 + cm < c1 <
1
k 1 [mU + (1 m)x] + cm, or there exists a k such
that Uc1 cm + 1 < k 
mU+(1 m)x
c1 cm + 1.
It would not be profitable for the moneyholder to search with money and a commodity
if the cost of carrying the commodity, c1   cm, exceeds the gain of engaging in barter with
11
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Figure 2: A comparison of utility gained in accepting money between random and direct
money search frameworks.
a probability of 1k 1 . Searching with both will save on the search cost, since search cost is
incurred only once for each search, regardless if the agent carries money, a good, or both.
Proposition 5. In monetary equilibrium, a moneyholder would carry only money to search
iﬀ c1 > 1k 1 [mU + (1   m)x] + cm or there exists a suﬃciently large k such that k >
mU+(1 m)x
c1 cm + 1.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show some numerical results for this model. For all numerical results,
we set r = 0.001,m = 0.5, c = 0.01, x = 0.1 and U = 1. Molico (2006), who provides a
good example of numerical analysis of a money search model, finds that r = 0.001 yields
an approximately normal distribution for money holdings and other key variables. In my
model, welfare is maximized when m is set to approximately 0.5, and the decision to set
U = 1 follows BCKW, mostly for reasons of tractability. The value c = 0.01 and x = 0.1 are
used to introduce a simple form of transaction and production costs to the model.
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Figure 3: Expected utility for diﬀerent searching strategies of a moneyholder at steady state
in non-cooperative direct money search.
Figure 2 shows that the gain for accepting money in the random money search model
diminishes in k, as in BCKW. Note, however, that direct money search shows that the gain
for accepting money monotonically increases in k. This is particularly important, in that it
conforms with economic intuition about the gain in accepting money being positively related
to the number of good types, k. The gain from searching with a commodity diminishes when
there are more type of goods in the market.
In a random search framework, the expected utility of a moneyholder and a barterer
in monetary and non-monetary equilibria approaches 0 when k approaches infinity. With
random money search, the likelihood of searching with money decreases because the expected
utility of accepting money decreases with an increasing number of good types, k. However,
in reality, the opposite seems to be more plausible: having more types of good to choose
from should not decrease the value of holding money. In the random search framework,
whether money is introduced or absent, the expected utility converges to zero as the number
of good types increases, implying that no one would trade and the system would converge
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Figure 4: Expected utility at steady state for value functions in non-cooperative direct money
search.
to an autarkic equilibrium.
Even given some search cost in random search11, there exists a suﬃciently large k such
that the expected utility of a moneyholder and barterer will be zero. Hence, it would result
in autarkic equilibrium for any given value of m, c1, cm, r and x. It seems unrealistic that,
when the number of goods is large enough, no one will trade with or without money. For
example, we have a healthy monetary exchange economy with millions of types of good in
the world today.
In comparison, non-cooperative direct search presents a result closer to the general eco-
nomic intuition that the benefit of accepting money increases or at least does not diminish
with k.
Proposition 6. When k ! 1, monetary equilibrium still exists and a moneyholder would
11The traditional KW random search framework contains storage costs rather than search costs, while
BCKW use search cost in their money search model.
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carry only money to search for any c1, cm, r,m > 0 and m, r 2 (0, 1).
Figure 3 shows diﬀerent value functions for the direct money search model. The value
function for holding money and a commodity to search converges to a positive value as k
approaches infinity. The value function of searching with a commodity only quickly goes
to zero as k increases. This result has an interesting implication: agents will be unlikely
to search without money unless there are few good types in the market. The more good
types in the market the more likely the agents will search with money and commodities or
money alone. These intuitive results follow from the present direct search framework, but
contradict the earlier random search models.
Corollary 1. The cash-in-advance constraint framework is a (strict) special case of the
money search model with conditions that satisfy Proposition 5 (Proposition 6).
People will only search and buy when they have money in hand. This phenomenon
is equivalent to the cash-in-advance constraint framework. That being said, the cash-in-
advance framework can be regarded as a special case of the direct money search model,
where the agent would search only when they have the money (or cash) in hand when the
search cost is positive and k is large enough to deter search with a commodity, which appears
to be unprofitable. This implies that for any given parameter values, there exists a unique
solution to the equation for monetary equilibrium.
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5 Conclusion
People have diﬀerent desires and needs at diﬀerent times. Without perfect knowledge of the
agent’s desire, there exists a role for money in exchange, given a suﬃciently large number of
good types. Compared to the the random search framework, direct money search conforms
better with basic economic intuition. The idea that the monetary equilibrium using random
search becomes infeasible with a suﬃciently large number of goods is particularly troubling.
In the direct money search model with a less rigid form of the Wicksellian triangle pre-
sented here, monetary equilibrium can be satisfied with increasingly large k. The ineﬃciency
of bartering due to low probability of matching depends on the large number of good types.
In addition, the value of accepting money is at least non-decreasing when the number good
types increases. Generally, the variety of goods is positively correlated with trade with
money, however, random matching in money search models leads to a negative correlation.
Given these technical challenges, there must exist other reasons to proceed with the equiv-
alent class of random money search models. The use of random money search may be
applicable to specific cases, but non-cooperative direct money search appears to be a useful
alternative.
By focusing on the number of types of goods in a direct money search model, this paper
oﬀers a novel connection between two well-known frameworks, the cash-in-advance frame-
work and the money search framework. This connection may serve as a starting point
for intuitively understanding both frameworks and combining their features to improve the
tools of monetary policy analysis. In this regard, future research should fully extend the
integration of cash-in-advance models with money search models.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. An agent can always choose to stay at home or at his market, which
gives him a lower bound of zero utility. It costs him nothing to stay at home or his market.
If other strategies give value lower than zero, he will always choose to stay home. So, he can
always choose the strategy to stay home or at his market. Hence the value function cannot
be lower than zero. This lemma is also established by Goldberg (2007).
Proof of Lemma 2. If an agent carries both money and a good into the marketplace for trade,
he would barter to get his desired good if he finds a seller who likes his good. Otherwise he
would exchange with money, unless the seller is already a moneyholder.
Suppose that exchanging with money is preferred to bartering when a searcher brings
both money and a good to the market.
(A.1)
⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm] + mU
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
where the oﬀer of money is preferred for trade
>
⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
where the bartering is preferred for trade
The RHS denotes the value function for a searcher searching with a good and money
who prefers to barter, whereas the LHS denotes the value function for a searcher seaching
with a good and money who prefers to oﬀer money in exchange for a good. The inequality
becomes:
(A.2)
mU
r(k   1) >
 ⇧(1 m)
r(k   1) [U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)
Rearranging this inequality gives
(A.3)U(1  1
⇧
) + x > Wm  W1
The incentive condition for holding money is
 x  ✏+Wm  W1 > 0 and ⇧ = 1, (A.4)
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hence, Wm  W1 > x+ ✏ > x for ✏ > 0.
But the inequality from the incentive condition for holding money and ⇧ = 1 imply:
x > Wm  W1, (A.5)
which contradicts.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that an agent will choose not to search if the alternative
strategies give the same utility. We have to show that no one would accept money in an
exchange and bringing money to market are redundant, such that,
max{V1, S1}    x  ✏+max{Vm, Vb} (A.6)
and no one would choose to search. To show that no one would choose to search, it also
means that all agents would prefer to stay, such that V1  S1 = 0,max{Vm, Vb}  Sm = 0.
This implies that n1, nc, nm = 0. This causes the Equations [1] and [2] to become:
(A.7)W1 = max{ U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
V1 :search with commodity
, 0|{z}
S1 :stay with commodity
}
Wm = max{⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x]  cm
r| {z }
Vm :search with money
,
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
Vc :search with commodity
, 0|{z}
Sm :stay with money and commodity
}
(A.8)
In a non-monetary autarkic equilibrium, S1 > V1, therefore:
c1   u
(k   1) (A.9)
and, Sm   Vm gives:
cm   (1 m)[U + x] (A.10)
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Since no one chooses the strategy to search, no matching will occur and no exchange can
take place. This is an equilibrium because the cost of searching exceeds the expected gain
in utility from matching.
Proof of Proposition 2. For a non-monetary bartering equilibrium, agents are indiﬀerent
between searching with a commodity and staying, such that V1 = S1, Vc = Sm, and
max{Vc, Sm} > Vm. This implies that nm = nb = 0, so the Equations [1] and [2] become:
W1 = max{ U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
,
n1U(1 m)
r(k   1) +
mncU
r(k   1)} (A.11)
Wm = max{⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x]  cm
r| {z }
Vm :search with money
,
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
,
n1U(1 m)
r(k   1) +
mncU
r(k   1)} (A.12)
When a moneyholder abandons searching with money because max{Vc, Sm} > Vm , his
payoﬀ for W1 is the same as for a non-moneyholder. This means their strategic behavior is
the same, so the distribution of agents with or without money will be the same, such that
n1 = nc = ✓.
Letting nc = n1 = ✓ gives:
u
r(k   1)  
c1
r
=
✓u(1 m)
r(k   1) +
✓um
r(k   1) (A.13)
and solving for ✓ gives:
✓ = 1  c1(k   1)
u
(A.14)
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and, 0 < ✓ < 1 since 0 < n1, nc < 1, then
u
c1
+ 1 > k > 1 (A.15)
It must be the case that the value of searching with a commodity is greater than 0,
satisfying Lemma 1.
c1 <
u
k   1 (A.16)
k <
u
c1
+ 1. (A.17)
Proof of Proposition 3. To search with money, the condition for a moneyholder is:
max{Vm, Vb} > max{Vc, Sm} (A.18)
To accept money in exchange for a good, the condition for the non-moneyholder is
 x  ✏+max{Vm, Vb, Vc, Sm} > max{V1, S1} (A.19)
From the condition to search with money, the equation above can be simplified to
 x  ✏+max{Vm, Vb} > max{V1, S1} (A.20)
It would be suﬃcient to show that Wm > W1 to ensure the monetary equilibrium con-
dition is satisfied. Thus, Vc is redundant to check in the sense that Wm > W1 equals
Wm > max{V1, S1} where W1 = max{V1, S1}. Given that the value function of a money-
holder searching with commodity only is Vc, Vc = V1 means Wm > max{V1, S1}   Vc. As
long as the condition for monetary equilibrium is satisfied, search with a commodity is not
20
profitable for a moneyholder.
Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 2, we know that an agent will only search when
c1 >
u
k 1 , hence the LHS of the inequality is satisfied such that k >
u
c1
+ 1.
As for the RHS of the inequality, from Proposition 3, we know that the inequality must
satisfy:
(A.21)
⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm]  cm
r| {z }
searching only with money
 ⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
searching with money and a commodity
(A.22)c1  1
k   1[mU + (1 m)[x+W1  Wm]] + cm
Hence, there exists a k such that k  mU+(1 m)[x+W1 Wm]c1 cm + 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. For an agent to choose a pure strategy of searching only with money,
the value function of searching with only money must exceed the value of holding both money
and a commodity, as follows:
(A.23)
⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm]  cm
r| {z }
searching only with money
>
⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
searching with money and a commodity
(A.24)c1   cm >  ⇧(1 m)
k   1 [U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
(k   1)
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(A.25)c1   cm > 1
k   1[U(1  ⇧(1 m)) + ⇧(1 m)[x+W1  Wm]]
For a monetary equilibrium, ⇧ is assumed to be 1. Hence,
(A.26)c1 >
1
k   1[mU + (1 m)[x+W1  Wm]] + cm
The above inequality is satisfied when k is suﬃciently large.
Proof of Proposition 6. For any r,m, c1, cm :
lim
k!1
V1 = lim
k!1
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
=  c1
r
< 0 (A.27)
lim
k!1
Sm  0 (A.28)
lim
k!1
S1   0 (A.29)
lim
k!1
(Vm   Vb)   0 (A.30)
lim
k!1
(Vm   S1)   0 (A.31)
This satisfies the incentive constraint for holding money such that Vm = max{Vm, Vb} >
S1   0 and Lemma 1 for the exchange participating constraint.
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Table 2.1: A table showing the sensitivity analysis for the expected utility of holding money.
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